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Forecasting errors pose a serious problem of identification, often neglected in 
empirical applications. Any attempt of estimating choice models under uncertainty may 
lead to severely biased results in the presence of forecasting errors even when individual 
expectations on future events are observed together with the standard outcome variables.   
Forecasting errors pose a serious problem of identification, often neglected in 
empirical applications.   Any attempt of estimating choice models under uncertainty and 
of the relevant structural parameters may lead to severely biased results in the presence of 
forecasting errors even when individual expectations on future events are observed 
together with the standard outcome variables.  Unfortunately this is almost  never the 
case in microeconometric explorations.   C. Manski raised an important point in a series 
of very authoritative contributions that should have left the mark, but apparently received 
little attention by practitioners  (1999, 2000, 2004).    According to Manski (2004)   
“observed choices may be consistent with many alternative specifications of preferences 
and expectations, so researchers assume particular sorts of objectively correct (i.e. 
rational) expectations … This practice reduces the task of empirical inference to 
revelation of preferences (outcomes)  alone, but has contributed to a crisis of 
credibility”
1. 
                                                 
1 The plausibility of rational expectations has, notoriously, been questioned by many. One of them is 
Manski himself.   Serious doubts on the assumption of rational expectations have been cast by Kahnemann 
and Tverski (1987).  According to Pesaran (1987)  rational expectations  “are based on extreme 
assumptions and cannot be maintained outside the tranquillity of a long-period steady state”.   
   
The aim of this paper is to carry Manski’s argument one small step further: even if 
individual expectations on future events were fully observable,  identification may be a 
problem when people make forecasting errors, i.e. when expectations do not match up 
with ex-post realizations.    
More specifically,  I show how the identification problem comes about in the 
presence of agents who incur in forecasting errors, and indicate the conditions that allow 
the estimation bias to be relatively contained.     
The classical problem of job-switching provides a good case:  workers who 
receive an outside offer face the choice of accepting the offer and moving to a different 
position, or staying on the present job.  Once the choice is made, it is irreversible at least 
in short run. The existence of exit costs from wrong decisions is a crucial element for the 
argument discussed in this paper.  
It is reasonable to assume that workers act on the basis of a two-dimensional 
preference function in two arguments:  future wage growth and job quality (however 
measured).  Labor economists  often  engage  in the  estimation of parameters like the 
marginal rate of substitution between wage growth and job quality. 
Assume a very simplified world, with two states of nature: G (good) and B (bad), 
occurring with probability p and (1-p), and two options,  M (move) and  S (stay).     
Outcomes associated with G  have a higher payoff than  those occurring  under  B.  All 
workers face the following payoff  matrix (tab. 1), identical for all individuals:  
 
 Tab.  1 
  State of nature = G  State of nature = B 
M  (move)         U (M,G)         U (M,B) 
S   (stay)         U (S, G)         U (S, B) 
Prob (occurrence)               p         ( 1 –p ) 
 
The ranking of the four outcomes is irrelevant for the time being.  It may be 
assumed here that if  the “good” state of nature (G)  obtains,  movers and stayers,  having 
made the optimal choice,  will be equally or nearly equally well off, the former attaining 
higher wage growth at the cost of lower job quality.  If “bad” (B) prevails,  the 
conservative stayers will end up on a lower utility curve, dominating nonetheless the movers’ outcome under the same state of nature. If p  is “subjectively perceived” 
sufficient close to1, agents will choose either M or S, depending on their preference 
ordering between wage growth and job quality.  In this case the trade-off is identified (or 
nearly identified)  if the workers’ choices are known. With p approaching 0,   
identification may be at hand, depending on the distance between the stayers’ and the 
movers’ utilities.   
 
 
Fig. 1 Four possible outcomes for movers and stayers. 
  
But in real life uncertainty is the rule,  p  will be distant from 0 and 1, and  agents 
will take optimal ex-ante decisions on the basis of their subjective expectations on  p.  
With many agents playing the game, some will predict correctly, and some wrong.   
 
Suppose Mr. Smith is offered a job at Fiat: excellent if the auto industry does well 
(state G), terrible if not (state B). Mr. Smith puts a high probability on state G, chooses  
M accordingly, but  he proves wrong as B occurs. So he is stuck at Fiat, with utility U(M, 
B) < U(M,G).  Ex-post  Mr. Smith may be viewed as an “overconfident risk-taker” who 
was hit by bad luck. But he may have done the right thing ex-ante.   
Ex-post, we observe the states of nature, the choice made by each agent  (M or S), 
and the outcome in  terms of wage growth and job quality.  But the ex-ante subjective 
probabilities are never revealed,  so that it will be impossible to distinguish the agents 
who made the right prediction from those who made the wrong one.  If agents share similar preferences, observations will clusters around the four outcomes displayed in fig. 
1 according to the agents’ choices.   Unless the agents’ expectations are revealed, no 
identification of the utility parameters will be possible: the stayers’ outcomes will be 
found on the loci 2 and 3; the movers’ on the loci 1 and 4.   Choice data alone do not 
reveal the preferences of agents.  They reveal only that preferences and expectations 
combine to yield the observed outcomes.  The same conclusion holds a fortiori in the 
more likely case in which agents’ expectations will not be the same.  
 
Under special conditions identification will be viable in the presence of 
forecasting errors: if the utility differentials among “good” and “bad” outcomes are 
sufficiently small, the trade-off will re-emerge simply as a consequence of “squeezing” 
(fig. 2).  This is more likely to occur when the choice set is continuous and convex (as in 
the textbook examples of a consumption mix between butter and jam; or a production 
mix involving skilled and unskilled workers): in such cases the objective functions are 
often flat at their optimum.  Thus agents may be “near optimal” in utility but far from the 
optimal mix in terms of actions taken.   Here too, identification may not be a major 
problem. 
2   
 
Fig. 2 “squeezed” utilities allow identification (the graph displays the outcomes with 
many decision makers holding different payoffs). 
                                                 
2   In the simplest textbook examples learning takes place rapidly and decisions can be adjusted,   If,  for 
instance, ex-ante expectations on quality and prices prove wrong, individuals will quickly adjust them and 
shift to the optimal bundle, without incurring in exit costs. Thus repeated observations of this kind of 
individual decisions will not display the pattern that precludes identification.    
 In many real-life examples, however, the choice set is discrete and the exit cost 
from a wrong decision may be  high.  More often than not economic decisions do not 
involve marginal factor adjustments, but choices among “big” options that yield large 
gains or losses depending on the states of nature 
3:  organizational styles, physical 
irreversible investments, large financial operations, mergers and acquisitions, crucial 
individual decisions on working careers and family lifestyles.  Similar features denote the 
decisions of a government or a social planner (à la Arrow) in the field of social welfare, 
urban development, educational policy, etc.  where final outcomes are observable at the 
end of long run processes, and the environment is characterized by uncertainty.  Likewise 
for agencies or judicial courts  invested with “tragic choices” (à la G. Calabresi). 
4  
 
Manski  has  strongly advocated the collection of  data on expectations and their 
use in empirical studies to relax or validate assumptions about expectations. 
5   The 
conclusion of  his  2004 survey reads  “ I have concluded that econometric analysis of 
decision making with partial information cannot prosper on choice data alone….. 
Economists should abandon their antipathy to measurement of expectations. The 




                                                 
3  The idea that real life choices are essentially among discrete options was present also in Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem of social choice:  Contini (1966)  proved that when the choice  set is compact and 
continuous the postulate of “relevance of irrelevant alternatives” is tautologically true, and becomes 
therefore irrelevant.   But Contini’s result was  assessed as scarcely interesting for the very reason that any 
realistic choice set of a social planner is discrete (T. Majumdar, 1969).            
4   None of the above decisions involve repetitive situations where external conditions are constant, learning 
about future events allowed to take place and rational expectations formed.   A job switch (aside, perhaps, 
for a very young person at the beginning of his working life) is usually a long term investment.   Purchasing 
a new house is an almost irreversible choice involving big exit costs, especially if you realize that your 
neighbors are unbearably      
unfriendly.   Deciding to bear a third child at age 45, ten years after  your last one, may change the course 
of one’s life. 
 
5 Perceptions of job insecurity in response to verbal questions such as the General Social Survey are 
available through the Survey of Economic Expectations (SEE), as discussed in Dominitz and Manski 
(1997).   Manski (2004)  reviews a number of case studies where data on expectations have been collected.  
He mentions that outside the U.S.  only  in  the Italian Survey of Investment in Manufacturing  are  firms  
asked to provide probabilistic predictions of product demand  (Guiso and Parigi, 1999). 
 An illustrative example 
A recent study of job changing behavior provides a good example of how forecast 
errors impact on identification. The exploration was performed on a large longitudinal 
sample of Italian male workers between the mid 80’s and the mid 90’s, a decade 
characterized by an expansionary period through the early 90’s, followed by a long 
recession.
6.  Movers and stayers were observed after three years since the decision to 
move or stay, on the assumption that such options are evaluated over a relatively long 
time horizon. Workers will consider mobility as a profitable alternative to their current 
position on the basis of two main elements: future expected earnings (long run wage 
growth)  and expected job quality or job safety.  The role of expectations on future events 
is, therefore, of crucial importance for move-vs-stay decision.  Some workers may be 
risk-averse, some overconfident and take more risks than others facing a given job offer; 
some may decide on the basis of their colleagues’ advice and act out of salience (she/he 









Fig. 3 : Wage growth percentiles (movers & stayers). 
                                                 
6    B. Contini, “Testing bounded rationality vs. full rationality in job changing behaviour”,  W.P. 
LABORatorio R. Revelli  (2008),  and  IZA W.P   In this paper I argue that  bounded rationality appears to 
explain job changing outcomes better than models assuming full rationality.  Forecasting errors on the 
timing of recession is certainly one of the causes of many bad outcomes observed in this exploration, but 
not the only ones. One of  the main  hypotheses of bounded rationality rests on the fact that people have 
limited information  and are unable to process it correctly.  Thus forecasting errors are one of many 
different aspects that characterize bounded rationality.   















































Fig. 4 :  Risk-on-the-job percentiles (movers & stayers). 
 
Fig. 3 and 4 display the unconditional percentile distributions of wage growth and 
risk-on-the-job of movers and stayers:  while more than 50% of the movers do better than 
their fellow stayers in terms of wage growth,  80% do much worse in terms of risk-on-
the-job.
7    
Fig. 5  displays the scatter of movers’ outcomes:  wage growth and risk-on-the-
job, conditional on a large set of covariates (age, industry, firm size, skill level, 
geographical location, individuals’ past history).  Any reasonable utility function defined 
in terms of wage growth and risk-on-the job should yield a positively inclined efficiency 
frontier, improving in the N-E direction.
8  This scatter reveals almost nothing, except the 
fact that, wherever a positively sloped efficiency frontier may lie, the vast majority of 
observations is strongly dominated by those (very few) relatively close to any of such 
frontiers.  
                                                 
7   Risk-on-the-job is measured as the ratio between the worker-specific predicted likelihood of dismissal in 
the past 1986-91 time window  and a forward looking firm-specific indicator of employment  trend over the 
subsequent three-year period 1991-94. Real wage growth is here measured by  w(t) / w(t-3) on a three-year 
window starting at the time of the job switch (it is therefore equal to  (1 + growth rate) ).  
8    A simple Cobb-Douglas utility yielding a linear efficiency frontier is   
U = wage growth/risk-on-the-job.  A more general utility function   










































stayers    
Fig. 5  1150 movers’ outcomes.  
 
A fragile, although significantly positive trade-off  between wage growth and risk-
on-the-job has been estimated at 0.08.
9  The huge downward bias of this estimate is 
evident with a simple calculation: the median mover aiming at a modest increase of 2 p.p. 
in wage growth in three-years-time (from 1.22 to 1.24.  The 75-percentile of wage growth 
is 1.55, which is 33 p.p. higher than the median), appears to be willing to trade it for an 
enormous increase of risk-on-the-job, from his median value of 0.15 up to  0.33 which is 
way above the 75-percentile  (equal to 0.25).  A tradeoff of this magnitude makes no 
sense.  Why do we get such a result that persists after a variety of robustness tests ?  The 
difficulty of forecasting into the  future must have played a major role.  The recession 
began to creep in the Italian economy in early 1992 after a 5-year expansion period, 
reaching its trough in 1994.  Employment took a sudden downturn in many industries, 
well below what could have been reasonably expected at the beginning of the Nineties: a 
striking 25% of the sample movers who switched jobs around 1991  end up in firms that 
exit the market before the end of 1994,  while only a more modest 10% of the stayers 
(who did not make the switch) are in the same position.  A large number of  job changers 
must have held over-optimistic predictions of risk-on-the-job, responsible for very 
negative consequences on outcomes.  
 
                                                 
9  B. Contini (2008), p. 16. Problems caused by incompetence, ignorance of the environment, difficulty of 
predicting future events appear in a variety of different contexts, and especially in studies 
of investment and/or financial decisions.  For instance,  
S. Benartzi and R. Thaler (2007) report financial and investment decisions that 
look almost casual, often dictated by prejudice and ignorance.  T. Jappelli (2007) and A. 
Lusardi  (2007) report analogous results in the choice of retirement plans. In all these 
cases any attempt to estimate risk propensity (or any other parameter of the utility 
functions)  from the  individuals’  ex-post decisions is bound to yield severely biased 
results. Estimated  behavior will appear unreasonable, as was found in the previous 
example of job-switching.  It would be insane running to the conclusion of attributing to 
the  Benartzi-Thaler-Jappelli-Lusardi  investors  features of risk propensity estimated 
from their own behavior. 
 
Conclusion 
Imperfect information (and, consequently, wrong courses of action)  lead to   
inefficient resource allocation, unless there are appropriate insurance markets.  Not 
surprisingly, imperfect  information and the possibility of making wrong predictions on 
future events is the cause of serious drawbacks also on identification. 
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